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CODE SECTIONS: 
BILL NUMBER: 
SUMMARY: 
O.C.G.A. § 6-2-5.1 (amended); 12-3-
315 (amended); 15-11-66 (amended); 
15-21-112, 149 (amended); 16-10-51 
(amended); 17-6-1, 2 (amended); 17-
10-3.1 (amended); 17-15-7, 8, 10 
(amended); 20-2-984.2 (amended); 33-
9-43 (amended); 40-1-8 (new); 40-2-
136 (amended); 40-5-1, 2, 24, 52, 55, 
57.1,58,62,63,63.1,64,66,67,69, 
75, 85, 142, 148.1, 151, 152, 153 
(amended); 40-5-67.1, 67.2 (repealed); 
40-6-3, 291, 391, 392, 393, 393.1, 394 
(amended); 40-6-391.2 to -391.3 
(repealed); 40-6-410 to -25 (new); 42-
4-7 (amended), 42-8-34, 111, 112 
(amended); 50-5-200 to -210 (new) 
SB 502 
The bill proposed the consolidation of 
existing nUl laws in Georgia and the 
addition of new sections to the Georgia 
Code that would address perceived 
ambiguities caused by recent Georgia 
223 
1
: MOTOR VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC Operating While Under the Influence:  P
Published by Reading Room, 2006
224 
History 
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court decisions. Specifically, the bill 
was intended to facilitate the collection 
of admissible evidence by law 
enforcement officers in DUI cases. For 
example, the bill proposed the 
availability of implied consent 
chemical testing where there is 
"probable cause" to believe that a 
suspect is operating a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol, 
drugs, or other substances in certain 
circumstances. Further, the bill would 
have allowed for the admissibility of 
chemical test results where the 
defendant driver did not consent to the 
testing, but a valid warrant was 
obtained. Additionally, the bill would 
have allowed for the admissibility of 
chemical test results where the law 
enforcement officer misread or failed to 
read portions of the implied consent 
notice. 
The current DUI laws in Georgia span multiple titles and sections 
of the Georgia Code. 1 Georgia's implied consent provisions in its 
DUI laws were at the forefront of the proposed legislation in the 2006 
term.2 The history of the DUI laws in Georgia and recent court cases 
interpreting the existing law shed light on the reasons for the proposal 
of Senate Bill 502.3 
1. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. §§ 6-2-5.1 (2005); 15-21-112 (2005); 17-10-3.1 (2005); 40-5-52 (2005). 
2. See SB 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem.; HB 1222, as introduced, 2006 Ga. 
Gen. Assem. 
3. See 1968 Ga. Laws 448; O.C.G.A. §§ 40-5-55, -67.1 (2005). 
2
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 18
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol23/iss1/18
2006) LEGISLATIVE REVIEW 225 
Schmerber v. California4 
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court held that a police officer 
can forcibly take blood from a suspect, so long as the officer has 
probable cause to believe that a suspect has committed the criminal 
offense of driving an automobile while intoxicated.5 In the case of 
Schmerber v. California, the petitioner was arrested while he was at a 
hospital seeking treatment for injuries suffered in a car accident.6 At 
the direction of a police officer, a hospital physician withdrew a 
sample of his blood.7 The report of his blood alcohol percentage was 
admitted at trial, and he was convicted.8 The petitioner objected to 
the admissibility of the report, claiming that it violated his Fourth 
Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures.9 
The Court first noted that a suspect's Fourth Amendment right to 
be free of unreasonable searches and seizures applies to the 
compelled withdrawal of blood. 10 The Court then asked whether the 
police were justified in requiring petitioner to submit to the test, and 
whether the means and ~rocedures employed in taking petitioner's 
blood were reasonable. I Finding the ends justified (there was 
probable cause to suspect petitioner of a criminal violation) and the 
means reasonable (the attempt to secure evidence was an appropriate 
incident to his arrest), the Court concluded that no violation had taken 
place. 12 
Implied Consent Laws 
In the wake of this decision, Georgia adopted "implied consent" 
laws to minimize the risk of violent confrontations between police, 
medical personnel, and suspected impaired drivers.13 These laws 
4. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
5. Id. at 767-68. 
6. Id. at 758. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 759. 
9. Id. 
10. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767. 
II. Id. at 768. 
12. Id. at 768-72. 
13. See 1968 Ga. Laws 448; Adam Ferrell, Rodriguez v. State: Addressing Georgia's Implied 
Consent Requirements for Non-English-Speaking Drivers, 54 MERCER L. REv. 1253, 1257 (2003) 
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provide for consequences such as license suspension if the driver 
refuses to consent to testing, and the laws provide for the admission 
into evidence of the fact that the driver refused testing. 14 In Georgia, 
a defendant's refusal to submit to testing gives rise to an inference 
that a test would have shown the presence of a prohibited substance. IS 
An often-cited section of Georgia's implied consent laws reads: 
[A]ny person who operates a motor vehicle upon the highways 
or elsewhere throughout this state shall be deemed to have given 
consent, subject to Code Section 40-6-392, to a chemical test or 
tests of his or her blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substances 
for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol or any 
other drug, if arrested for any offense arising out of acts alleged 
to have been committed in violation of Code Section 40-6-391 or 
if such person is involved in any traffic accident resulting in 
serious injuries or fatalities. 16 
Several recent cases have called into question the meaning and 
application of these laws. 17 
Cooper v. State18 
In 2003, the Georgia Supreme Court held a portion of Georgia's 
implied consent law unconstitutional. I9 In August of 2000, two 
drivers were involved in a head-on collision in Barrow County, 
Georgia.2o The trooper investigating the scene discovered that one 
driver had suffered a broken arm and, fursuant to Georgia law, 
administered a blood test to both drivers. I The trooper was acting 
(stating that Georgia's original implied consent laws have changed very little since first introduced in 
1968). 
14. See Ferrell, supra note 13, at 1257. 
15. See Kelly v. State, 528 S.E.2d 812 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). 
16. O.C.G.A. § 40-5-55 (2005). 
17. See Audio Recording of Senate Proceedings, Feb. 23, 2006 (remarks by Sen. William Hamrick), 
http://www.georgia.gov/00/artic1e10,2086,4802_6107103_ 4 7120055,OO.htrnl, [hereinafter Senate 
Audio]. 
18. Cooper v. State, 587 S.E.2d 605 (Ga. 2003). 
19. Id.at607. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 607-08. 
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under Code section 40-5-55, which dictates that a person involved in 
any traffic accident resulting in serious injuries or fatalities has, by 
operation of law, given consent to chemical testing?2 One of the 
drivers, Carey Don Cooper, tested positive for cocaine, and was 
convicted for driving under the influence of cocaine?3 
Prior to trial Cooper moved to suppress the blood test results, 
arguing that "to the extent that O.C.G.A. [section] 40-5-55 allowed 
the state to require a person to consent to a [blood test] without 
probable cause, the statute was unconstitutional under the State and 
Federal Constitutions.,,24 The trial court denied the motion?5 On 
appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that the relevant 
provision of Code section 40-5-55 was unconstitutional under 
"Article I, Section I, Paragraph XIII of the 1983 Georgia Constitution 
and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the 
United States because it authorizes a search and seizure without 
probable cause.,,26 The Court emphasized that "[a] suspect's Fourth 
Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures 
applies to the compelled withdrawal of blood.,,27 Because the statute 
authorized a search without probable cause, based solely on the 
occurrence of a traffic accident, the court deemed it 
unconstitutional. 28 
State v. Colliel9 
In 2005, the Georgia Supreme Court held that, under Georgia law, 
if a suspect refuses to submit to chemical testing, a police officer 
cannot obtain a search warrant to compel him to submit to such 
testing.3o In State v. Collier, the evidence at trial showed that the 
defendant drove through a red light and collided with another car, 
22. Id. at 608. 
23. Id. at 607-08. 
24. Cooper, 587 S.E.2d at 608. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 607. 
27. Id. at 608 (citing Welch v. State. 331 S.E.2d 573 (Ga. 1985». 
28. Id. at 612. 
29. State v. Collier, 612 S.E.2d 281 (Ga. 2005). 
30. Id. at 284. 
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killing both passengers of that car.31 The defendant fled the scene, but 
was later caught by police.32 After police gave the imf:lied consent 
warning, the defendant refused to submit to testing. 3 When the 
police threatened to get a search warrant and use a catheter to collect 
the necessary samples, Collier consented, and was later convicted of 
vehicular homicide.34 
On appeal, the defendant argued that he was misled by police 
because they could not compel him to submit to testing if he would 
not consent. 35 The Georgia Supreme Court agreed. 36 The court 
pointed to the language of Code section 40-5-67.1, which provides, 
"If a person . . . refuses, upon the request of a law enforcement 
officer, to submit to a chemical test ... no test shall be given.'.37 The 
court held under the plain meaning of this law that if an individual 
does not consent to the designated test, then no test can be 
administered, under warrant or otherwise.38 Georgia's implied 
consent statute, therefore, provides greater protection for citizens than 
either the Georgia Constitution or the U.S. Constitution.39 
Hough v. State40 
Again, in 2005, the Georgia Supreme Court was asked to rule on 
the applicability of Georgia's implied consent laws.41 In January of 
2003, Bryan Reid Handschuh drove off the side of the road and his 
truck flipped into an embankment.42 The investigating officer noticed 
that the truck smelled like alcohol and he discovered a half gallon 
bottle of Crown Royal, most of which had been consumed.43 At the 
31. Id. at 282; see also Bill Hamrick, Editorial, Keeping Drunks off Road, DOUGLAS DAILY NEWS, 
Feb. 10, 2006. 
32. Collier, 612 S.E.2d at 282. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 284. 
37. Collier, 612 S.E.2d at 283 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 40-5-67.1 (2005) (emphasis in original». 
38. Id. at 283-84. 
39. See id. at 284. 
40. Hough v. State, 620 S.E.2d 380 (Ga. 2005) (affinning in part and disapproving in part of the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals in Handschuh v. State, 607 S.E.2d 899 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004». 
41. [d. at 382-83. 
42. [d. at 386. 
43. [d. 
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hospital, the officer infonned Handschuh of his implied consent 
rights and asked him to submit to a blood test.44 Handschuh refused 
to submit, and six days later he was arrested for driving under the 
influence of alcohol.45 Evidence of his refusal to submit to the blood 
test was introduced at trial, and Handschuh was convicted.46 
On appeal, Handschuh argued that the language of Georgia's 
implied consent statutes, the implied consent warning cannot be 
given until suspect is actually arrested.47 The Georgia Supreme 
Court agreed, noting that the plain and unambiguous wording of the 
statute's language mandates that a suspect must be under arrest 
before his implied consent rights are read to him.48 The statute limits 
that requirement, however, to situations in which the suspect has not 
been involved in an accident involving serious injury or fatalities.49 If 
the suspect has been in such an accident, held the court, nothing in 
Georgia's implied consent laws required arrest as a precondition to 
implied consent testing - probable cause alone is sufficient to lead 
to warning of implied consent. 50 
Response to Cooper, Collier, and Hough 
In the 2006 session of the General Assembly, several groups 
supported legislation to respond to these recent court decisions.51 
Senator Bill Hamrick, a sponsor of SB 502, noted that these decisions 
severely restrict law enforcement officers in their efforts to gather the 
evidence necessary to convict drunk drivers. 52 Specifically, Senator 
Hamrick pointed to an incident in his home district in which the 
44. !d. 
45. Id. (Handschuh would not respond directly to the officer's requests, but he told a nurse that he 
would not allow his blood to be drawn). 
46. Handschuh v. State, 607 S.E.2d 899, 902 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005), aff'd in part, Hough v. State, 620 
S.E.2d 380 (Ga. 2005). 
47. Hough, 620 S.E.2d at 384-87. 
48. [d. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 382. The limitations of Cooper are no longer at issue when there is probable cause. Id. at 
386. 
51. See Interview with Irene Muon, Douglas County District Attorney's Office, Mar. 22, 2006 [hereinafter Munn Interview] (stating that Governor's Office of Highway Safety, the District Attorneys 
Association, and the Solicitor's Association were all in favor of new legislation). 
52. See Hamrick, supra note 31; see also Telephone Interview with Sen. Bill Hamrick, Senate Dist. 
No. 30 (Apr. 17,2006) [hereinafter Hamrick Interview]; Senate Audio, supra note 17. 
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Georgia Supreme Court excluded evidence needed to convict a man 
who killed a child and grandmother while driving under the influence 
of cocaine. 53 That incident, culminatin~ in the Collier decision, 
prompted Senator Hamrick to take action. 4 
At the same time, the Governor's Office of Highway Safety was 
conducting a five-month study to focus on the controversies and 
issues involved in Georgia's DUI laws.55 The study found that over 
five hundred Georgia drivers are killed in alcohol-related crashes 
annually, and that over thirty percent of the fatal crashes in Georgia 
involve alcohol. 56 Working with that office, Senator Hamrick 
proposed SB 502 to serve as a comprehensive overhaul of Georgia's 
DUI laws, gathering all DUI-related provisions together in one 
section, and to address and correct the obstacles presented under 
current implied consent laws. 57 
Bill Tracking 
HB 1222 
At the same time that SB 502 was introduced in the Senate, HB 
1222 was introduced in the House.58 HB 1222 was introduced by 
Representatives Mark Hatfield, Barry Fleming, David Ralston, 
Timothy Bearden, Charlice Byrd, and Stan Watson of the 177th, 
117th, 7th, 68th, 20th, and 91st districts, respectively. 59 HB 1222 was 
described as an implied consent bill that proposed to provide a 
comprehensive revision and reform of DUI laws in Georgia.6o HB 
1222 was first read in the House on February 2, 2006.61 The House 
Committee on Judiciary Non-Civil reported favorably on a substitute 
53. See Hamrick interview, supra note 52. 
54. See id 
55. Press Release, Governor's Office of Highway Safety, Why Is SB 502 Needed? (undated) (on file 
with The Georgia State University Law Review). 
56. Id 
57. See Hamrick interview, supra note 52. 
58. See State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 1222, Feb. 2, 2006 (Mar. 30, 2006). 
59. See HB 1222, as introduced, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem; Georgia General Assembly - HB 1222, 
http://www.legis.ga.gov/legisl2005_06/sum/hbI222.htrn (last visited November 16, 2006). 
60. See HB 1222, as introduced, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
61. See State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 1222, Feb. 2, 2006 (Mar. 30, 2006). 
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bill on March 8, 2006.62 Following the third reading of the bill on 
March 13, 2006, the bill failed to pass by a narrow margin.63 This 
vote foreshadowed the fate of Senate Bill 502.64 
SB 502 
Senate Bill 502 was introduced by Senators Bill Hamrick, Joseph 
Carter, Preston Smith, Judson Hill, and John Wiles of the 30th, 13th, 
52nd, 32nd, and 37th districts, respectively.6s Like HB 1222, SB 502 
was read for the first time on February 2, 2006.66 On February 15, 
2006, the Senate Committee on Public Safety and Homeland Security 
favorably reported the committee substititute to SB 502.67 Following 
a second reading of the bill on February 16,2006 and a third reading 
on February 22, 2006, on February 23, 2006 in a near-unanimous 
vote the Senate passed and adopted SB 502 by committee 
substitute.68 
SB 502 was read for first time in the House on February 28,2006, 
and was read again the following day.69 After much delay and 
deliberation, the bill could not garner enough support in the House 
and was eventually taken off the table.7o 
62. See State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 1222, Mar. 8, 2006 (Mar. 30, 2006); 
Georgia General Assembly - HB 1222, http://www.legis.ga.govllegisl200S_06/sumlhbI222.htm (last 
visited November 16,2006). 
63. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, HB 1222 (Mar. 13,2006) (76 Yea, 84 Nay, 13 
Not Voting, 7 Excused); Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, HB 1222 (Mar. 13, 2006) (Motion to Reconsider) (66 Yea, 92 Nay, IS Not Voting, 7 Excused). 
64. See S8 502, as introduced, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
65. SB 502, as introduced, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
66. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 502, Feb. 2, 2006 (Mar. 30, 2006). 
67. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 502, Feb. 15,2006 (Mar. 30,2006); Georgia 
General Assembly - SB 502, http://www.legis.ga.govllegisl2005_06/surnlsb502.htm (last visited 
November 16, 2006). 
68. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 502, Feb. 16,2006 (Mar. 30,2006); State of 
Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 502, Feb. 22, 2006 (Mar. 30, 2006); see also Georgia Senate 
Voting Record, S8 502 (Feb. 22, 2006) (reflecting that only Sen. Gloria Butler of the 55th District voted 
against the Bill). The committee substitute is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 79-130. 
69. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 502, Feb. 28, 2006 (Mar. 30,2006); State of 
Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 502, Mar. 01, 2006 (Mar. 30, 2006). 
70. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 502, Mar. 01,2006 (Mar. 30, 2006); Muon 
Interview, supra note 51. 
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HE 1275 
Even though HB 1222 and SB 502 were both defeated, proponents 
of stricter and more clarified DUI legislation won a small victory 
when an implied consent-related amendment was approved in HB 
1275.71 HB 1275 was sponsored by Representatives Vance Smith, 
Johnny Floyd, Ed Rynders, Tom Graves and Mickey Channell of the 
129th, 147th, 152nd, 12th, and 116th districts, respectively.72 HB 
1275 was a bill purporting to require the revocation of a commercial 
drivers license if the holder of the license was in violation of Code 
sections 16-8-2 through 16-8-9, defining crimes of theft.73 HB 1275 
was passed and adopted by the House on March 2, 2006 and adopted 
by the Senate on March 27, 2006.74 
Following the termination ofSB 502, Senators Joseph Carter of the 
13th District, Ronnie Chance of the 16th District, and Jim Whitehead, 
Sr. of the 24th District proposed an amendment to HB 1275.75 As 
amended, HB 1275 would insert new Code section 40-5-67.1 that 
would read: "Nothing in this Code Section shall be deemed to 
preclude the acquisition or admission of evidence of a violation of 
Code Section 40-6-391 if obtained by voluntary consent or a search 
warrant as authorized by the Constitution or laws of this state or the 
United States.,,76 The amenedment was adopted by the Senate and 
amended HB 1275 was passed by the Senate on March 27th, 2006.77 
The House adopted HB 1275 as passed by the Senate, including the 
floor amendment, on March 28, 2006.78 Presumably, this amendment 
was in response to the Georgia Supreme Court's holding in State v. 
Collier that evidence obtained by search warrants after implied 
consent is refused is not admissible.79 
71. See HB 1275, as passed, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
72. See HB 1275, as introduced, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
73. Id; O.C.G.A. §§16-8-2 through 16-8-9 (2006 Supp.). 
74. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 1275, Mar. 2, 2006 (Mar. 30, 2006); State of 
Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 1275, Mar. 27, 2006 (Mar. 30,2006). 
75. HB 1275, (SFA), 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
76. HB 1275, as passed, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
77. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 1275, Mar. 27, 2006 (Mar. 30, 2006). 
78. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 1275, Mar. 28, 2006 (Mar. 30, 2006). 
79. See Hamrick Interview, supra note 52; see also State v. Collier, 612 S.E.2d 281 (Ga. 2005). 
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The Act 
Section 1, if passed, would have provided legislative intent. 80 
Section 1-1, if passed, would have amended Title 40 by adding new 
Code Section 40_1_8.81 This new section would have prohibited the 
operation of motor vehicles while under the influence of alcohol, 
drugs, or other substances.82 This new section would have also 
provided for implied consent for chemical testing.83 
Section 1-2 would have amended Title 40 by adding new Article 9 
to Chapter 5.84 This new section would have provided relevant 
definitions.85 This new section would have provided for chemical 
testing for persons suspected of driving under the influence of 
alcohol, drugs, or other substances.86 
This new section would have provided for the procedures to obtain 
and perform such tests.87 This new section would have provided for 
the administration of warnings in regard to such tests.88 If passed, this 
new section would have provided for independent tests under certain 
circumstances.89 
Section 1-2 would have provided for certain qualifications for 
persons performing such tests and certain instruments used in said 
testing.9o This new section would also have provided for the 
admission into evidence of the results of such tests and certifications 
of such testing instruments.91 If passed, this new section would also 
have provided for certain immunities.92 
If passed, section 1-2 would have provided for certain 
disclosures.93 This new section would have also provided for the 
taking of the driver's license of the person thought to be operating a 
80. SB 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. !d. 
86. SB 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
87. !d. 
88. Id. 
89. !d. 
90. Id. 
91. !d. 
92. SB 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
93. Id. 
11
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motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or other 
substances. 94 This new section would also have provided for 
temporary driving permits under certain circumstances.9s 
Section 1-2 would have also provided for certain reports for law 
enforcement officers and COurt.96 This new section would have 
provided for the suspension and revocation of a driver's license under 
certain circumstances.97 This new section would have provided for 
procedures for such revocations and suspensions.98 
This new section would have provided for hearings in certain 
circumstances.99 If passed, this new section would have provided for 
reinstatement of a driver's license in certain circumstances. lOo This 
new section would have provided for compensation for law 
enforcement officers for attending hearings. 101 
Section 1-3, if passed, would have amended Title 40 by 
redesignating the existing provisions of Article 15 of Chapter 6, 
relating to serious traffic offenses, as Part I, and inserting a new Part 
11. 102 This new section would have provided for sanctions and 
penalties for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol, drugs, or other substances. 103 This new section would have 
prohibited the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence 
of alcohol, drugs, or other substances while transporting a child under 
the age of 14 years. 104 
Section 1-3 would have prohibited the operation of a school bus 
while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or other substances. lOS 
The new section would have provided that legal entitlement to use 
alcohol, marijuana, or other drugs shall not constitute a defense. l06 
94. Id. 
9S. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. sa S02, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. [d. 
102. [d. 
103. [d. 
104. sa S02, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
lOS. [d. 
106. [d. 
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Furthennore, this new section would have provided that certain pleas 
shall constitute prior convictions for sentencing purposes. \07 
If passed, section 1-3 would have provided for the discretion of the 
court to accept certain pleas. 108 This new section would have 
provided for the adoption of such laws by ordinance by political 
subdivisions. l09 In addition, this new section would have provided for 
the publication of the photographs and fact of conviction for certain 
offenders. I 10 
If passed, section 1-3 would have provided for the admissibility of 
certain evidence. III Additionally, this new section would have 
provided for the seizure and forfeiture of certain vehicles operated by 
certain violators. I 12 
Sections 2-1 to 2-19, if passed, would have amended various code 
sections by updating citations in order to remain consistent with the 
sections of this proposed Act. 113 
Section 2-20, if passed, would have amended Title 40 of the 
Georgia Code by striking Code section 40-5-55, relating to implied 
consent to chemical tests, and renders that Code section reserved. 114 
Section 2-21 to 2-27, if passed, would have updated various Code 
sections so that citations would remain consistent. 115 Section 2-28, if 
passed, would have amended Title 40 of the O.C.G.A. by striking 
Code section 40-5-67, rendering it reserved. I 16 
Section 2-29, if passed, would have amended Title 40 of the 
Georgia Code by repealing Code Section 40-5-67.1, relating to 
107. fd. 
108. fa. 
\09. fd. 
110. sa 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
lll. fd. 
112. fd. 
113. See sa 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem., §§ 2.1 - 2.19, amending Code 
sections 6-2-5.1 (Supp. 2005),12-3-315 (Supp. 2005), 15-11-66 (Supp. 2005), 15-21-112 (Supp. 2005), 
12-3-315 (Supp. 2005), 15-11-66 (Supp. 2005), 15-21-112 (Supp. 2005),15-21-149 (Supp. 2005),17-6-
1 (Supp. 2005), 17-6-2 (Supp. 2005), 17-10-3.1 (Supp. 2005), 17-15-7 (Supp. 2005), 17-15-8 (Supp. 
2005), 17-15-10 (Supp. 2005), 20-2-984.2 (Supp. 2005), 33-9-43 (Supp. 2005), 40-2-136 (Supp. 2005), 
40-5-1 (Supp. 2005), 40-5-2 (Supp. 2005), 40-5-24 (Supp. 2005), 40-5-52 (Supp. 2005). 
114. Compare sa 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem., with O.C.G.A. § 40-5-55 
(Supp. 2005). 
115. See sa 502 as passed by the Senate, §§ 2-21 - 2-27, amending Code sections 40-5-57.1 (Supp. 
2005), 40-5-58 (Supp. 2005), 40-5-62 (Supp. 2005), 40-5-63 (Supp. 2005), 40-5-63.1 (Supp. 2005), 40-
5-64 (Supp. 2005), 40-5-66 (Supp. 2005). 
116. Compare sa 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem., with O.C.G.A. § 40-5-67 
(Supp. 2005). 
13
: MOTOR VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC Operating While Under the Influence:  P
Published by Reading Room, 2006
236 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW (Vol. 23:223 
chemical tests. 117 Section 2-30, if passed, would have amended Title 
40 of the Georgia Code by repealing Code section 40-5-67.2, relating 
to terms and conditions for suspension of license under subsection (c) 
of Code section 40-5-67.1. 118 
Section 2-31, if passed, would have amended Title 40 of the 
Georgia Code by striking Code section 40-5-69, relating to 
circumstances not affecting suspension by operation of law, and 
replacing it with a new Code Section 40-5-69. 119 Sections 2-32 to 2-
37, if passed, would have amended various Code sections to be 
consistent with the applicable sections ofthe proposed Act l20 
Section 2-38, if passed, would have amended Title 40 of the 
Georgia Code by striking Code section 40-5-153, rendering the 
section reserved. 121 Section 2-39 to 2-40, if passed, would have 
amended Title 40 ofthe Georgia Code by updating Code citations. 122 
Section 2-41, if passed, would have amended Title 40 by striking 
Code section 40-6-391, rendering it reserved.123 Section 2-42, if 
passed, would have amended Title 40 by repealing Code section 40-
6-391.1, relating to entry of plea of nolo contendre. 124 
Section 2-43, if passed, would have amended Title 40 by repealing 
Code section 40-6-391.2, relating to seizure and forfeiture of a motor 
vehicle by a habitual violator. 125 Section 2-44, if passed, would have 
amended Title 40 by repealing Code section 40-6-391.3, relating to 
the penalty for a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol 
117. Compare S8 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem., with O.C.G.A. § 40-5-67.1 
(Supp. 2005). 
118. Compare S8 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem., with O.C.G.A. § 40-5-67.2 
(Supp. 2005). 
119. Compare S8 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem., with O.C.G.A. § 40-5-69 
(Supp. 2005). 
120. See S8 502, as passed by the Senate, §§ 2.32 - 2.37, amending Code sections 40-5-85 (Supp. 
2005),40-5-142 (Supp. 2005), 40-5-148.1 (Supp. 2005),40-5-151 (Supp. 2005), 40-5-152 (Supp. 2005). 
121. Compare S8 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem., with O.C.G.A. § 40-5-153 
(Supp. 2005). 
122. See S8 502, as passed by the Senate, §§ 2.39 to 2.40, amending Code sections 40-6-3 (Supp_ 
2005),40-6-291 (Supp. 2005). 
123. Compare S8 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem., with O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391 
(Supp. 2005). 
124. Compare S8 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem., with O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391.1 
(Supp. 2005). 
125. Compare S8 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem., with O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391.2 
(Supp. 2005). 
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or drugs while driving a school bus. 126 Section 2-45, if passed, would 
have amended Title 40 by striking Code section 40-6-392, rendering 
it reserved. 127 
Section 2-46 to 2-52, if passed, would have amended Title 40 by 
updating applicable citations. 128 
Section 3-1, if passed, would have ensured that new Code sections 
would not alter any existing proceedings, sentences, etc. 129 Section 3-
2, if passed, this section would have provided an effective date.130 
Section 3-3, if passed, would have repealed conflicting laws. 131 
Analysis 
SB 502 was introduced to the Senate as a comprehensive "implied 
consent" bill. 132 Senator Bill Hamrick, who co-sponsored SB 502, 
classified the purpose of the bill during the March 13, 2006 Senate 
floor debate as "renumbering and recomposing current law as it is 
applied in nUl cases" in Georgia. 133 According to Senator Hamrick, 
SB 502 would close loopholes used by criminals who break nUl 
laws, prevent criminals from avoiding punishment due to 
technicalities, and respond to recent appellate court decisions whose 
interpretations of nUl laws have severely restricted law enforcement 
officers in their efforts to obtain needed evidence to convict drunk 
drivers. 134 
The proponents of SB 502 expressed that they were primarily 
concerned with technicalities in the existing nUl laws that were 
126. Compare SB 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem., with O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391.3 
(Supp. 2005). 
127. Compare SB 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem., with O.C.G.A. § 40-6-392 
(Supp. 2005). 
128. See SB 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem., amending Code sections 40-6-393 
(Supp. 2005), 40-6-393.1 (Supp. 2005), 40-6-394 (Supp. 2005),42-4-7 (Supp. 2005), 42-8-34 (Supp. 
2005), 42-8-111 (Supp. 2005), 42-8-112 (Supp. 2005). 
129. SB 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. Interview with Sen. Gloria Butler, Senate Dist. No. 55 (Mar. 22, 2006) [hereinafter Butler 
Interview]. 
133. See Senate Audio, supra note 17 ("CurrentlY, it's more difficult to try a DUI case than it is a 
murder case because there's a lot of technicalities in the law, and because it's spread out through a lot of 
code sections."). 
134. /d.; see also Governor's Office of Highway Safety, supra note 55. 
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allowing motorists to evade DUI convictions for seemingly trivial 
reasons. 135 Particularly, SB 502 aimed to relieve confusion in the area 
of implied consent notices. 136 The current DUI laws provide three 
different implied consent warnings that law enforcement officers 
must read to drivers prior to seeking their consent for testing. 137 In 
the past, courts have routinely suppressed important test results from 
evidence in situations where the wrong consent notice was read to the 
accused, or where the court determined that a portion of the notice 
was misleading. 138 SB 502 proposed that the three warnings of the 
current law be streamlined into one warning to avoid confusion and 
provide fewer loopholes for DUI suspects. 139 The proposed bill 
would not differentiate between drivers based on age or drivers 
license c1assification. 14o The bill also emphasized that the warning 
would not be required to be read exactly as it appears in the statute, 
"so long as the substance of the notice remains unchanged.,,141 
135. See Senate Audio, supra note 17 (remarks of Sen. Hamrick). 
136. See id.; see also SB 502, §§ 1-2, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. (proposing the 
addition of Code section 40-5-202). 
137. See O.C.G.A. § 40-5-67. I (b) (2004) (providing three various warnings to be read depending on 
whether the suspect is (a) over the age of21; (b) under the age of21; or (c) driving a commercial motor 
vehicle). 
138. See Cooper v. State, 587 S.E.2d 605 (Ga. 2003) (holding that a driver's consent to withdraw 
blood was invalid where officer misled defendant concerning his implied consent rights); Richards v. 
State, 500 S.E.2d 581, 582-83 (Ga. 1998) (holding that evidence of chemical breath test was 
inadmissible where officer did not give proper implied consent warning); State v. Chun, 594 S.E.2d 732, 
733 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Peirce, 571 S.E.2d 826 (2002); State v. Terry, 511 S.E.2d 608, 610-11 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1999); Parrish v. State, 456 S.E.2d 283, 283 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995); Carswell v. State, 320 
S.E.2d 249, 252 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that where defendant was never informed of his right to 
refuse testing, defendant's blood alcohol test results were inadmissible). 
139. See SB 502, §§ 1-2, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. (proposing the insertion of 
Code subsection 40-5-202(c»; see also, Senate Audio, supra note 17. Code subsection 40-5-202(c) 
would have read as the following: 
At the time a chemical test or tests are requested, the following implied consent notice 
shall be read to the person: Georgia law requires you to submit to state administered 
chemical tests of your blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substance for the purpose of 
determining if you are operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs 
or with a prohibited substance in your body. If you submit to this testing, the results may 
be used against you in a court of law or in an administrative proceeding. If you refuse to 
submit to this testing, your Georgia driver's license or privilege to drive on the highways 
of this state may be suspended for a minimum period of one year and your refusal may be 
used as evidence against you. If you submit to the state's testing, you are entitled to 
additional chemical tests of your blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substance at your 
own expense and from qualified personnel of your own choosing. Will you submit to the 
state administered testing under the implied consent law? 
SB 502, §§ 1-2, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
140. See SB 502, §§ 1-2, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen Assem. 
141. See id. (proposing the addition of Code subsec!ion 40-5-202(b) to the existing Code). 
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Specifically, SB 502 expressly emphasizes that "[t]he informing of or 
failure to inform the accused person concerning the implied consent 
law shall not affect the admissibility of such results in any case.,,142 
These additions were expected to result in greater admissibility of 
pertinent evidence, and reduce acquittals on the basis of mere 
technicalities in notice procedures. 143 These additions, however, may 
have ultimately played a significant role in the bill's inability to 
gamer sufficient support in the Georgia House of Representatives, as 
skeptics questioned the motive of such a change. 144 
According to proponents of SB 502, another problem with existing 
DUI laws is that the arrest requirement in the current law places 
financial burdens on the cities and counties in Georgia. 145 After the 
holding in Hough v. State, cities and counties are required to actually 
arrest drivers prior to invoking implied consent for testing. 146 SB 502 
would have allowed officers to invoke implied consent testing if there 
were "reasonable grounds to believe" that the suspect was driving 
under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or other substances. 147 SB 502 
thus removed the requirement that an actual arrest be made before 
implied consent warnings are read and prevented law enforcement 
officers from having to bring suspects to city and county facilities 
prior to testing. 148 The bill also proposed the elimination the portion 
of Code section 40-5-55 that does not require an arrest prior to 
testing, which the Georgia Supreme Court held unconstitutional in 
Cooper v. State. 149 The bill proposed the addition of a new section 
emphasizing that in all circumstances, a finding of reasonable 
grounds to believe a person was operating a motor vehicle under the 
influence alcohol or drugs will authorize a law enforcement officer to 
142. See id. 
143. See Governor's Office of Highway Safety, supra note 55; Senate Audio, supra note 17 (remarks 
of Sen. Hamrick). 
144. See Interview with Sen. Bill Hamrick, supra note 52. 
145. See Governor's Office of Highway Safety, supra note 55. 
146. Id. 
147. See SB 502, §§ 1-2, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen Assern. (proposing the insertion of 
new Code section 40-5-201 into existing DUI laws). 
148. See Senate Audio, supra note 17; see a/so SB 502, §§ 1-2, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. 
Gen. Assem. (requiring a finding of probable cause prior to invoking implied consent). 
149. See SB 502, §§ 1-2, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen Assem. 
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"obtain ... chemical tests of a person's blood, breath, urine, or other 
bodily substance. ,,150 
Proponents of SB 502 also believe that the current law inhibits law 
enforcement officers from gathering sufficient actual evidence to 
convict drunk drivers. 151 Under existing common law, once a DUI 
suspect refuses to consent to DUI testing, law enforcement officials 
cannot use any other means of gathering evidence, and thus proving 
that a driver was intoxicated becomes difficult. 152 SB 502 seeks to 
allow for easier collection of evidence for the purposes of DUI 
convictions by allowing for testing if a warrant is obtained, regardless 
of whether consent is given by the driver. 153 If adopted, this addition 
would make it more difficult for impaired drivers to avoid chemical 
testing, and would thus make it easier for law enforcement officers to 
collect incriminating evidence. 154 There do not appear to be any 
constitutional restraints on such testing without actual consent, as 
long as probable cause is present. 155 
According to proponents of SB 502, further confusion exists in the 
current DUI law as to when testing must occur in order to be 
admissible. 156 Under the current Georgia Code section 40-5-55, 
testing must occur "as soon as possible" for any person operating a 
motor vehicle who is involved in any traffic accident resulting in 
150. See SB 502, §§ 1-2, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen Assem. (proposing that a law 
enforcement officer be authorized to conduct testing for the presence of alcohol or other drugs if there 
are "reasonable grounds" to believe that the person operated a motor vehicle while impaired); see also 
Cooper v. State, 587 S.E.2d 605, 607 (2003) (holding that to the extent that the implied consent statute 
required chemical testing of the operator of a motor vehicle involved in a traffic accident resulting in 
serious injuries or fatalities, regardless of any determination of probable cause, it authorized 
unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the State and Federal Constitutions). 
151. See Governor's Office of Highway Safety, supra note 55. 
152. State v. Collier. 612 S.E.2d 281, 284 (Ga. 2005); see Senate Audio, supra note 17 ("This bill will 
allow law enforcement to get a warrant just as they can in any other case following constitutional 
procedure to gather evidence."). 
153. See SB 502, §§ 1-2, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. (proposing the insertion ofa 
new Code subsection 40-5-202(f), which reads, "[i]f the person refuses to submit to the state 
administered test authorized by this Code section, nothing in this article shall be deemed to preclude the 
acquisition or admission of such evidence by any means authorized by the Constitution or laws of this 
state or of the United States"); see also Senate Audio, supra note 17. 
154. See SB 502, §§ 1-2, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
155. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,767 (1966) (holding that the withdrawal of blood and 
the use of a blood analysis do not violate a person's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination); 
see also State v. Collier, 612 S.E.2d 281, 283 (Ga. 2004) (stating that the Georgia Constitution generally 
does not protect citizens from the compelled testing of certain bodily substances and the use at trial of 
the results of such compelled testing). 
156. See O.C.G.A § 4O-5-55(a) (2005) (stating that testing must occur "as soon as possible"). 
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"serious injuries" or fatalities. 157 Under the language in the existing 
law, there are discrepancies as to the meaning of "as soon as 
possible" and "serious injuries.,,158 Courts have suppressed evidence 
of test results where the State was unable to demonstrate that testing 
occurred "as soon as practicable" under the circumstances, thus 
allowing defendants to avoid convictions. 159 SB 502 removes the "as 
soon as possible" and "serious injuries" language from the law 
completely by striking existing Code section 40-5-55(a).160 
Not everyone is convinced that the current DUI laws require 
dramatic textual changes. 161 Opponents of SB 502 insist that there is 
little ambiguity in Georgia's current implied consent laws and that 
the drastic changes in the law proposed by SB 502 are 
unnecessary.162 DUI attorney Robert Chestney believes that the 
motivation behind SB 502 was that prosecutors did not want drivers 
to be able to refuse testing, as they are able to do under Georgia's 
current implied consent laws. 163 Mr. Chestney insists that legislators 
went too far in eliminating the need for arrest in non-injury cases 
prior to testing and eliminating the right to full disclosure about such 
testing. l64 Further, Mr. Chestney points to the fact that SB 502 does 
not include penalties for officers who fail to properly advise drivers 
of their implied consent rightS. 165 This omission, Chestney insists, 
eliminates the incentive for law enforcement officers to read the 
implied consent warning at all, and thus leaves motorists with less 
protection. 166 
157. [d. 
158. See Governor's Office of Highway Safety, supra note 55. 
159. See State v. Becker, 523 S.E.2d 98, 100-01 (1999) (holding that the trial court had insufficient 
evidence for detennining whether urine and blood tests were given "as soon as practicable" under the 
circumstances, absent evidence of how much time passed after the accident, and absent evidence as to 
whether state patrol could have obtained urine sample at a closer patrol post). 
160. See SB 502, §§ 2-20, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. (removing from the Code 
the text of the existing version of Code section 40-5-55). 
161. See Interview with Robert Chestney, Mar. 22, 2006 [hereinafter Chestney Interview]. 
162. [d. (stating that the implied consent laws have "worked well for 40 years, and didn't need 
fixing"). 
163. [d. 
164. !d.; see SB 502, §§ 2-20, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. (striking Code 
subsection 40-5-55(a), which was interpreted in Cooper v. State, 587 S.E.2d 605 (Ga. 2003) as being 
unconstitutional absent a showing of probable cause); see also SB 502, §§ 1-2, as passed by the Senate, 
2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. (adding Code section 40-5-202, which proposes that evidence cannot be 
suppressed if the wrong implied consent notice is read to the defendant). 
165. Chestney Interview, supra note 161. 
166. [d. 
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Robert Chestney's partner in the Atlanta-based Chestney-Hawkins 
Law Firm, Michael M. Hawkins, expresses similar concerns about 
SB 502 and the motivations behind the bill. 167 Mr. Hawkins predicts 
that the 68-page bill would actually complicate the current state of 
DUI laws, rather than simplify the laws as the proponents of the bill 
suggest. 168 Senator Gloria Butler of the 55th District, the only Senator 
who voted against the bill, expressed similar concern with the length 
of the bill, stating that she was uncertain how such a lengthy bill 
could simplify the law. 169 
Mr. Hawkins also questions the legislature's motive in attempting 
to alleviate burdens on police officers in obtaining evidence in DUI 
cases. 170 The current law provides for drivers license suspensions 
when a suspect refuses a test, as well as the admission into evidence 
of the fact that the suspect refused.171 According to Mr. Hawkins, 
there is no empirical evidence to show that the conviction rate in DUI 
cases is lower in cases where the suspect refuses to take the test, and 
thus the change is unnecessary. 172 
Specifically, Hawkins finds that SB 502 is "far too broad" for a 
variety of reasons: (1) The bill allows a police officer to have a blood 
test forcibly administered without the citizen's consent;173 (2) the bill 
eliminates liability for medical personnel who participate in the 
forced blood and urine withdrawals; 174 (3) the bill eliminates the 
167. Comments of Attorney Michael M. Hawkins on Behalf of the Criminal Defense Bar [hereinafter 
Comments by Michael Hawkins] (''The proponents of SB 502 have not provided any evidence that the 
proposed legislation will have any impact on reducing highway fatalities [or that] the changes proposed 
are necessary to the prosecution ofDUI cases."). 
168. Comments by Michael Hawkins, supra note 167 ('The only results that SB 502 will achieve are 
an increase in uncertainty for police officers and the driving public, and litigation that will ultimately do 
more harm than good to the state's ability to hold impaired drivers responsible."). 
169. Butler Interview, supra note 132 (stating that the bill was proposed as an implied consent bill, 
but upon further review, it appeared that the majority of the bill did not pertain to implied consent at all). 
170. Comments by Michael Hawkins, supra note 167. 
171. Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 40-6-392(d) (2005) ("In any criminal trial, the refusal of the defendant 
to permit a chemical analysis to be made of his blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substance at the time 
of his arrest shall be admissible in evidence against him."). 
172. Comments by Michael Hawkins, supra note 167. 
173. Id. (stating that the bill will result in increased violence and tensions between citizens and police 
officers); see SB 502 as passed, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem., § 1-2. 
174. Id. (noting that because there are no statutes or regulations governing such conduct, a person 
who is injured or dies as a result of such testing will have no legal redress); see also O.C.G.A. § 40-6-
392(a)(2) (2005) ( "No physician, registered nurse, or other qualified person or employer thereof shall 
incur any civil or criminal liability as a result of the medically proper obtaining of such blood specimens 
when requested in writing by a law enforcement officer."). 
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requirement that a citizen be placed under arrest before testing can be 
required; 175 (4) the bill eliminates notice of Georgia's "legal limit" 
when an officer requests a driver's consent to testing; 176 (5) the bill 
eliminates the requirement that a law enforcement officer notify a 
driver that his license will be suspended if his blood/alcohol content 
is over the legal limit;177 (6) the bill removes the requirement that a 
driver be advised of his implied consent rights at the time of his 
arrest; 178 (7) the bill excludes all remedies for citizens who were not 
properly advised of their implied consent rights; 179 (8) the bill does 
not allow a citizen a reasonable amount of time to contact an attorney 
prior to deciding whether to submit to a chemical test;180 and (9) the 
bill eliminates the requirement that a defendant be entitled to obtain 
"full information" from the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) 
regarding chemical testing. 181 
Hawkins emphasizes that the original intent of Georgia's initial 
implied consent laws, as written in 1968, was to minimize tensions 
between law enforcement officers and citizens. 182 In Hawkins' 
opinion, SB 502 would have actually resulted in increased violence 
and tensions between citizens and police officers, as officers would 
have been held to lower standards in informing drivers of their rights, 
and officers would have been permitted to personally withdraw blood 
175. Comments by Michael Hawkins, supra note 167 (emphasizing that a person can be subdued by 
police and forced to submit to a blood test, even where the person has not yet been arrested by police); 
see SB 502, § 1-2, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. (proposing the addition of Code 
Section 40-5-201, which would allow for testing if there are "reasonable grounds" to believe that a 
person was driving a motor vehicle while impaired). 
176. Comments by Michael Hawkins, supra note 167 ( "How can a person make an informed choice 
about whether to submit to a chemical test when they are not told what is prohibited?"); see SB 502, as 
passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. (proposing the addition of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-202, which 
includes the text for the implied consent notice). 
177. Comments by Michael Hawkins, supra note 167 (noting that the current implied consent notice 
informs drivers that if their blood alcohol content is over the legal limit, they will lose their license for a 
minimum of one year, and asking why the legislature is "deciding to keep that a secret"). Id. 
178. Comments by Michael Hawkins, supra note 167 (questioning the rationale behind not notifying a 
citizen that he is under arrest until after his implied consent rights are invoked). 
179. /d. (quoting SB 502 as stating that, "failure to inform the accused person concerning the implied 
consent law shall not affect the admissibility of such results in any case"); see also SB 502, §§ 1-2, as 
passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. (proposing to add Code section 40-5-202(b». 
180. Comments by Michael Hawkins, supra note 167 (noting that at least ten states currently allow 
citizens reasonable access to counsel prior to deciding whether to submit to a chemical test). 
181. Id. (noting that the GBI is no longer required to publish its rules and regulations, and thus 
citizens are deprived of full information regarding testing procedures). 
182. Id.; see also 1968 Ga. Laws 448. 
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for testing purposes.183 Tensions between law enforcement officers 
and citizens may also have been heightened due to the fact that, under 
the proposed bill, a citizen could be subdued by police and forced to 
submit to a blood test, even where the person had not yet been 
arrested by police. 184 Further, SB 502 would have left motorists 
without legal redress if they were injured as the result of chemical 
testing procedures. 185 
Conclusion 
In the end, the opponents of SB 502 prevailed, but the battle is far 
from over.186 While the House did not pass SB 502, the proponents 
of SB 502 and HB 1222 won a victory with the passage of an 
amendment to HB 1275.187 HB 1275 specifically expresses that 
nothing in the Georgia nUl laws precludes the admission into 
evidence of any test results obtained by voluntary consent or valid 
search warrants. 188 This amendment is a direct response to the 
holding in State v. Collier that where a one refuses to consent to 
chemical testing, the State may not force chemical testing. 189 Under 
the amendment to HB 1275, evidence of chemical testing is 
admissible despite a defendant refusing to consent, provided that a 
valid warrant is obtained. 190 
Senator Hamrick, one of the co-sponsors of SB 502, is committed 
to proposing additional nUl legislation in the future. 191 While 
Senator Hamrick is uncertain of the specific reasons that the bill 
183. See Comments by Michael Hawkins, supra note 167. 
184. Id.; see also SB 502, §§ 1-2, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. (proposing the 
addition of Code section 40-5-201, which would allow for testing if there are "reasonable grounds" to 
believe that a person was driving a motor vehicle while impaired). 
185. Comments by Michael Hawkins, supra note 167 (noting that because there are no statutes or 
regulations governing negligent chemical testing, a person who is injured or dies as a result of such 
testing will have no legal redress). 
186. See Hamrick Interview, supra note 52 (stating that while SB 502 failed to gamer sufficient 
approval in the House, Sen. Hamrick intends to introduce additional DUI legislation in the future). 
187. See HB 1275, as adopted, 2006 Ga. Gen Assem. 
188. See ld. § 2 (adding subsection d.1 to existing Code section 40-5-67.1, which states, "Nothing in 
this Code section shall be deemed to preclude the acquisition or admission of evidence of a violation of 
Code Section 40-6-391 if obtained by voluntary consent or a search warrant as authorized by the 
Constitution or laws of this state or the United States." 
189. See Hamrick Interview, supra note 52. 
190. See HB 1275, as adopted, 2006 Ga. Gen Assem. 
191. See Hamrick Interview, supra note 52. 
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failed to garner sufficient support in the House Committee on 
Judiciary Non-Civil, he opined that legislators were skeptical of the 
"exclusionary rule," which proposed the admission into evidence of 
chemical testing results, even where the implied consent warning was 
not read exactly as written. 192 Having witnessed the nearly 
unanimous support for SB 502 in the Senate, Senator Hamrick hopes 
that in the future, legislation will be presented that a House 
committee will find more acceptable. 193 
Mark Begnaud, Andre Hendrick, Jared Lina, and Alfred Politzer 
192. Seeid. 
193. See id. 
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